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COMMENTS

GROW UP VIRGINIA: TIME TO CHANGE OUR FILIAL
RESPONSIBILITY LAW
Can you be held liable for your parents' living expenses? If you
live in Virginia, the answer may be yes.' Virginia is one of twentynine states with a "filial responsibility law" requiring adult children to financially support their parents under certain circumstances.2 These rarely enforced laws have created dire consequences for some in states with similar statutes. Virginia should
review these antiquated requirements to ensure its citizens are
not subject to draconian punishment for situations beyond their
control.
In recent years, Virginia's filial responsibility law has been
used for purposes not contemplated by its original architects. For
example, it has allowed a brother, who had run his mother's finances into the ground, to sue his sister to hold her liable for his
financial mistakes, burdening her with substantial litigation
fees. 3 The law has provided a forum for a stepfather to retaliate
against his wife's children after the children petitioned the court
to replace him as their mother's guardian.4 It has permitted a
man to sue his less solvent brother to contribute a greater portion
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
2. Northwestern MutualVoice Team, Who Will Pay For Mom's Or Dad's Nursing
Home Bill? Filial Support Laws And Long-Term Care, FORBES: INVESTING (Feb. 3, 2014,
8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/northwesternmutual/2014/ 02/03/who-will-pay-formoms-or-dads-nursing-home-bill-filial-support-laws-and-long-term-care/#32913a925620
(listing thirty states that have filial responsibility statutes as of 2014 including Puerto Rico). One of thesA thirty states-Iown-repealed its filial responsibility statute in 2015.
H.F. 157, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015). Therefore, the total currently stands at twentynine states.
3. Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, Associate, Pender & Coward (Mar.
28, 2016) (estimating billing around twenty to thirty hours for the matter).
4. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, Partner, Glasser & Macon, P.C. (Mar.
26, 2016).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:265

of their parent's luxury assisted living facility bill.' It has spurred
children of a mentally impaired man to pay for legal advice to
avoid significant monetary debt.6 In contrast, it has benefitted a
woman, allowing her to successfully hold her sister equally liable
for their mother's costs.7 Few lawyers or judges seem to be aware
of the law,' yet its potential impact could be devastating.
Other states' filial responsibility laws have also generated concern. A recent Pennsylvania case, Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of America v. Pittas, left many alarmed about the prospect
that the law may punish individuals solely as a result of their biological relationship.9 In Pittas, a nursing home used Pennsylvania's filial responsibility law to force liability upon a son for his
mother's entire nursing home debt after she moved to Greece
without paying her bill."° Some worry that Virginia nursing
homes will begin to use the filial responsibility statute to impose
similar liability."
While American life expectancy grows each year, citizens' longterm savings do not keep up. 2 Americans are also becoming increasingly mobile, unlike in the past when extended families
tended to reside in the same locality, leaving many parents geographically distant from their children.'3 The trend toward large
5. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, Director of Elder Law, ThompsonMcMullan, P.C. (Apr. 7, 2016).
6. Id.
7. Acting as a caretaker for her mother, a daughter incurred high monetary costs
and phyoioal injurioc, including multiple fractured vertebrae and her husband underwent
two hernia surgeries due to lifting the ninety-seven-year-old mother. Telephone Interview
with Kathy Pryor, Elder Law Attorney, Va. Poverty Law Ctr. (Mar. 30, 2016).
8. Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, supra note 3 (describing little
awareness of the statute among both lawyers and judges in the Southeastern Virginia legal community).
9. See Mari Park, The Parent Trap: Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America v. Pittas, How it Reinforced FilialResponsibility Laws and Whether FilialResponsibil
ity Laws Can Really Make You Pay, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 441, 443 (2013)
(discussing the implications of Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46
A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)).
10. 46 A.3d at 720.
11. See Deborah Elkins, Family Ties: A Little-Known 'Filial Support' Statute, VA.
LAw. WKLY. (Feb. 17, 2015); Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7 (noting
buzz about nurcing homer aiming to do thio in recent ycarr),
12. See Emily Brandon, Poverty IncreasingAmong Retirees, U.S. NEWS (May 21, 2012,
11:50 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/05/21/poverty-increa
sing-among-retirees.
13. Studies show that as adults increase in education level, they become less likely to
reside within proximity to their mothers. Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Proximity
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numbers of elderly Americans with less family nearby is a situation ripe for utilization of filial responsibility laws.
Under Virginia Code section 20-88, joint and several liability
may be applied to any person of "sufficient earning capacity or income, after reasonably providing for his or her own immediate
family, to assist in providing for the support and maintenance of
his or her [parent, if such parent is] in necessitous circumstances."'4 Though well-intentioned, this statute carries serious implications. First, unlike child support laws, where federal law requires enforcement in all fifty states, 5 it is unclear whether an
adult child living outside of Virginia would be liable-state courts
conflict on whether other state filial responsibility laws apply to
their citizens. 6 Second, the law's language is open to interpretation, leaving practitioners with little guidance. 7 Third, with the
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in the last century, the
statute's very purpose-to provide a safety net for the aging and
indigent-no longer carries the same urgency, leaving the statute
open to exploitation for matters of sibling rivalry or parent-child
conflicts, rather than providing a social good. For these reasons,
Virginia should act preemptively to either repeal or amend the
statute.
On its face, the Virginia law seems laudable, requiring private
payment by family members for costs that would otherwise be incurred by the state. However, upon closer examination, significant issues regarding implementation and fairness arise. The
Virginia statute has not lain dormant, but rather has been implemented without report.' 8 Other states have recognized the futility of filial responsibility laws and have preempted such abuse

and Coresidence of Adult Children and Their Parentsin the United States: Descriptionand
Correlates, 1, 8, 13-14 (Inst. for Study of Lab. (12A)), Discussion Paper No. 7431, 2013
(Ger.).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
16. Compare California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. 1958) (enforcing California filial responsibility statute in Texas), with Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Assistance v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ohio 1954) (not enforcing Pennsylvania law in Ohio).
17. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, supra note 3 (indicating
difficulty of understanding legal standard when faced with lawsuit pursuant to Virginia
Code section 20-88); Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5 (explaining
difficulty of predicting when clients may or may not be liable).
18. Most cases are settled out of court or are held in juvenile and domestic relations
court, one not of record. See Elkins, supra note 11.
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by repealing their laws.19 Virginia should act now to either repeal
the statute or amend it to ensure its citizens avoid inequitable
outcomes like the defendant in Pittas.
This comment discusses the background and development of
filial responsibility laws in England, the United States, and Virginia in Part I. Part II explains the purpose behind implementation of such laws while Part III discusses the problems enforcing
the filial responsibility law may cause. Lastly, Part IV explains
why past reasons for keeping the law are no longer valid.
I. BACKGROUND

Laws requiring children to provide for their parents are far
from a recent domestic phenomenon." American filial responsibility laws are statutory creations tracing directly back to the Elizabethan Poor Relief Act of 1601, which directed "the Father and
Grandfather, and the Mother and Grandmother, and the Children of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent Person or other
poor Person not able to work, being of a sufficient Ability, shall,
at their own Charges, relieve and maintain every such poor Person."21 The statute's purpose was to relieve the Crown treasury's
burden by imposing financial liability of the poor among private
persons instead.22 The United States inherited these laws during
the colonial era.23 England eventually repealed its filial support
law because of its impracticality;2 4 however, such laws remained
on the books in many American states.
19.

Today, twenty-nine states have filial responsibility laws, down from forty-five in

the 1950s. Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern
Society?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 195, 196 (1992); see also supra note 2.

20. See Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, J.L. & POL'Y 709, 710-11 (2001) (referencing how current filial responsibility
laws are descended from early Roman and Greek law and Judeo-Christian scriptures).
21. Poor Relief Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, VII (Eng.), http://www.workhouses.org.uk/
poorlaws/1601act.shtml.
22. Michael Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM. L.Q.
55, 55 (1967).
23. Park, supranote 9, at 444.
24. National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 29, (Eng.). A commission conducted to evaluate England's filial responsibility laws found them largely impractical because, among other things, they "impoverishe[d a] family just when they want[ed] more
money" (when a family member became ill) and caused inequitable results. See POOR LAW
COMMISSION, NEW POOR LAW OR No POOR LAW: BEING A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJORITY &
MINORITY REPORTS 1, 62, 107 (1909), http:/Ibabel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104
276599.
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In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to create
Medicare and Medicaid.25 Some view the passage of Medicaid as
abrogating filial responsibility laws.26 Congress created Medicaid
with the legislative purpose to provide for the sick and indigent,27
demonstrating the importance of this public policy. In determining eligibility under Medicaid, the government can only take into
account the income and resources of the recipient's spouse, not of
any other family members.2 8 In the 1970s and 1980s, Virginia
amended its filial responsibility statute, removing liability if the
parent became eligible for public benefits under Medicaid.29
Virginia is a "typical" example of a filial responsibility law with
its roots in colonial times.3" It was first enacted in 1920 to require
"able-bodied persons over sixteen ... to support their parents in
cities of one hundred thousand inhabitants or more" if the parent
was in destitute or necessitous circumstances.3 1 Since then, the
General Assembly has expanded and changed its wording; it now
establishes liability only if the parent is in "necessitous circumstances. 3 2 Mitchell-PowersHardware Co. v. Eaton defined "necessitous" as "[1]iving in or characterized by poverty," and determined it to be a question of fact to be evaluated under the relative
circumstances.3 3 Since the 1938 holding in Mitchell-Powers
Hardware v. Eaton, the Virginia legislature has omitted the "destitute" requirement in the statute. Thus the standard today is

25. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012)).
26. See Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113, 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (stating by passing
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D), Congress "abrogated the legal duty to support one's parents');
see also infra Part IV.D (discussing states that have repealed filial responsibility laws
based on this reasoning).
27. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: Advancing the Nation's
12 (Jan. 7, 1965) (commenting the nation's "oldest tradition" was to
Health, 1 PUB. PAPERS
"give 'an attention to health' for all... people").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (2012); see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
43 (1981) (upholding a regulation permitting determining spousal income in benefits to be
a reasonable exercise of power).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1975); see Katherine C. Pearson, FilialSupport
Laws in the Modern Era:Domestic and InternationalComparisons of Enforcement Practices for Laws RequiringAdult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 ELDER L.J. 269, 273
(2013).
30. Pearson, supra note 29, at 274.
31. VA. CODE, ch. 298 of Acts 1920 (Pollard, 1920).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
33. 171 Va. 255, 262-63, 198 S.E. 496, 499-500 (1938).
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ambiguous; a parent must be somewhat impoverished but not in
a "condition of extreme want."34
The Virginia statute establishes joint and several liability on
an adult child if he or she is over eighteen, has sufficient earning
capacity or income, and only after "reasonably providing for
[one's] own immediate family."35 Once liability is established, the
court "shall have the power to determine and order the payment"
for "support and maintenance" of the parent and may revise the
order over time.3" "Support and maintenance" means doing "more
than reliev[ing] the pangs of hunger," providing enough to "comport with the health, comfort and welfare of normal individuals
according to their standards of living, considering his or her own
means, earning capacity, and station in life."3 The juvenile and
domestic relations district court ("JDR") in which the parent resides has original jurisdiction over cases arising from the statute. 8 If a child does not comply with an order pursuant to the
statute, Virginia may impose criminal liability in the form of a
misdemeanor, punished by either a fine less than $500 or less
than twelve months in jail. 9 Lastly, the statute provides defenses
to liability: desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure to support
the child prior to the child's emancipation, and where the parent
is eligible for and already receiving public assistance." The type
of conduct that would rise to the level of desertion, neglect, and
abuse or willful failure to support has yet to be determined in
Virginia.4 '

34. Compare Mitchell-Powers Hardware, 171 Va. at 262, 198 S.E. at 499 (defining
"destitute"), with Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 534 (1978) (Arlington County) (interpreting filial responsibility law that no longer required "destitution" to hold a mother owning some jewelry, oriental rugs, and other property insufficient to outweigh evidence of
"necessitous circumstances").
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
36. Id. This provision makes Virginia's filial support statute unique because it allows
courtr to docide the amount a child is liablo for rogardless of tho initial amount asked for
by the plaintiff or prosecutor. See Donna Harkness, What Are FamiliesFor? Re-evaluating
Return to FilialResponsibility Laws, 21 ELDER L.J. 305, 322 (2013).
37. Mitchell-Powers Hardware, 171 Va. at 262-63, 198 S.E. at 499-500.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 532-33 (1978) (Arlington County)
(holding oocial coourity dooo not qualify undor thio exception).
41. States have interpreted similar defenses to filial responsibility laws with very different standards. Compare Pelletier v. White, 371 A.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1976) (claiming father willfully deserted son by failing to pay child support and having
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Case law interpreting Virginia Code section 20-88 is sparse; its
last recorded interpretation was in 1978.42 This could be for several reasons. First, parties must file filial support petitions in
JDR, a court not of record.43 Second, parties tend to settle out of
court, perhaps due to the personal nature of such cases or the
parties' effort to avoid extra legal costs.44 For these same reasons,
parties are less likely to appeal to state circuit court.45 Lastly, the
statute is usually a tool of last resort, where one child stubbornly
will not voluntarily provide for a parent-a circumstance that,
thankfully, is not widespread.46
In general, most Virginia cases implementing section 20-88
tend to arise out of tangential disputes, not those between the actual parent and child. Siblings can use the statute to sue each
other if they believe one is not providing sufficient financial support for a parent. In one situation, an adult-daughter who was
providing for her local mother used the statute to make her outof-state sister financially liable.4 7 The siblings settled in that case,
with the defendant sister agreeing to pay a lump sum and half of
her mother's future expenses." There were two less successful petitions in Southeast Virginia in which adult children used the
statute to sue a sibling to pay for a parent's expenses; the JDR
judge in both cases deemed the parent was not in "necessitous
circumstances," causing the petition to fail.49 In Peyton v. Peyton,

little role in his life), with Mitchell v. Pub. Welfare Div., 528 P.2d 1371, 1371-72 (Or. Ct.
App. 1974) (maintaining no "abandonment or willful desertion" where even though mother
had no part in raising son physically or financially, she did see him occasionally, buying
him birthday presents, and her financial struggle was no fault of her own), and Cannon v.
Juras, 515 P.2d 428, 429-30 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (forcing child to pay for mother because,
although she stood by and allowed her new husband to expel child from home, she did so
"unintentionally").
42. See Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. at 531.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016); Elkins, supra note 11.
44. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7 (providing example
of Virginia case ending in settlement).
45. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3 (indicating example where the plaintiff/mother originally appealed to circuit court, but decided later to
withdraw the appeal).
46. See Elkins, supra note 11 (citing Northern Virginia lawyer Yahne Miorini who explained, "adult children who have the resources generally step up if and when they can. If
they don't have the means, there is no reason to file a petition.").
47. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supranote 7.
48. Id.
49. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5.
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the most recently recorded Virginia case using section 20-88, a
petitioner was successful in bringing an action against a sibling
to contribute towards the support and care of his mother.5 ' Additionally, when a parent remarries, disputes between stepparents
and biological children can arise. This occurred in Virginia Beach
where a stepfather allegedly used section 20-88 as a sword
against his stepchildren to pay for their mother's costs, rather
than apply for Medicaid, in retaliation for the children bringing
an action for guardianship of their mother."1
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
A. Moral Theory
There is undoubtedly a moral justification for filial responsibility laws that stems from the Ten Commandments' requirement to
"honor thy mother and father.""2 Some argue filial responsibility
statutes "strengthen family bonds" because they codify an already
existing cultural and moral obligation to repay parents for their
support while instilling the value of caring for elderly parents.53
Others argue it could help incentivize parents to pay greater attention to their budget and save for retirement, knowing if they
do not, the burden may fall on the children.54 Some even argue it
strengthens sibling bonds because one child may be more apt to
take affirmative steps to assist a parent knowing he or she may
eventually be found liable.55
Generally, most Americans voluntarily care for their parents,
without need of legal action.56 Evidence points away from the no-

50. 8 Va. Cir. 531, 532, 534 (1978) (Arlington County) (establishing liability only after
finding the mother was in "necessitous circumstances" and the child had "reasonably
provid[ed] for his... own immediate family").
51. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4.
52. See Park, supranote 9, at 451.

53.

See Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Sup-

port Our Parents Be Effectively Enforced?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 501, 504 (2002); Katie Sisaket,

Comment, We Wouldn't Be Here If It Weren't For Them: EncouragingFamily Caregivingof
Indigent Parents,36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 69, 88-89 (2015).
54.
55.

See Park, supranote 9, at 452.
Id.
56. See SUSAN C. REINHARD ET AL., AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., VALUING THE
INVALUABLE: 2015 UPDATE 1, 3 (2015), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/val
uing-the-invaluable-2015-update-new.pdf (generating statistics showing the amount of
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tion that a filial support law is necessary to incentivize children.
Any adult child who chooses not to care for aging parents would
probably not undergo a change of heart solely because of an imposed legal obligation. Although perhaps an outlier, in the example above where a child sued her distant sister for financial support, the defendant sister claimed she withheld support for their
mother to protest her exclusion from the decision-making process
in her mother's living situation." Although unaware of the details
of the defendant's situation, one could speculate the reason given
for withholding support was possibly pretextual. The daughter
who needed help surely would have attempted to provide a carrot
before resorting to a statutory stick, considering her dire financial
state. Stubborn siblings do exist, but should be the minority of
circumstances when those who, having the means to do so, voluntarily support their parents.
Thus, although most would agree supporting a parent in need
is a rational policy, forcing this obligation upon autonomous
adults who may have legitimate reasons for turning their backs
on a parent, may be counterproductive. Such laws could potentially even violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause
because they entangle religious values with government.58 No one
has yet to challenge a filial support law in court on this theory;
however, justifying the enforcement of parental liability because
it is the "moral" thing to do could be interpreted as having an impermissible moral purpose (promoting religiously tinged values)
or excessively entangling the government with religion by making
the state the enforcer of Judeo-Christian values.59 Under this interpretation, filial support laws could violate the Establishment
Clause, making them unconstitutional.

Americans giving voluntary care to aging parents is on the rise).
57. Interview with Kathy Pryor, supranote 7.
58. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 326-27 (noting filial responsibility laws' historical
roots in religion and the potential for this to result in a First Amendment violation).
59. The Supreme Court interprets the Establishment Clause as requiring a law to: (1)
have a secular purpose; (2) not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting
religion; and (3) not fostering "excessive entanglement" of the government with religion.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (violating any of the three requirements
makes such a law invalid under the First Amendment).
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B. Contract Theory
Some argue parental liability is justified under a contract theory." This theory holds that an implicit contract forms between
parent and child, where in return for raising a son or daughter,
that child, will care for the parent during old age. To hold otherwise would allow the child to be "unjustly enriched."'" A filial responsibility statute therefore becomes "implicit legislative recognition" of the child's duty to support a parent.62
Opponents of this theory argue implying a contractual obligation on a minor is unjustified as children do not have the capacity
to consent. 63 Even if the contract theory were to hold up, the legal
obligation to support a child only lasts eighteen years, whereas
support of a parent is of indefinite duration.64 This also contravenes the common law principle presuming transfers between
parents and children as gifts. 6' Moreover, the quality of a parent's
support varies in every household. In other states, individuals
who grew up in households with arguably absent parents were
still held liable under their state's filial support statute.6 Although Virginia provides defenses for children whose parents'
conduct rose to the level of "desertion, abuse, or willful failure to
support,
it has yet to interpret the extent a parents' actions
must be a bar to liability.

60. See Park, supra note 9, at 451.
61. Id.
62. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statutory Provision Requiring
Reimbursement by Child for Financial Assistance to Aged Parents, 75 A.L.R.3d 1159
(1977).
63. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 326-27.
64. See Edelstone, supranote 53, at 506.
65. See, e.g., Brousseau v. Brousseau, 927 A.2d 773, 779 (Vt. 2007) ("[T]he presumption of gifts for transfers between parents and their children, including adult children, is
well established.'); Bowen v. Bowen, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (S.C. 2003) ("[he presumption
[where property is conveyed to a spouse or child] is that the purchase was designated as a
gift or advancement ..
"). But see Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 128, 581 S.E.2d 507, 508
(2003) (not presuming a gift when a parent-child transfer consists of retitling property).
66. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Juras, 501 P.2d 988, 989-90 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (holding
child must support mother, despite her absence during his childhood, because her mental
illness causing the "abandonment" was not a volitional act).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
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C. Easing Government's Medicaid Costs
The strongest and primary justification for filial responsibility
laws is to shift the burden of financing the indigent into the private sector, the same purpose prompting the English Parliament
to pass the Elizabethan Poor Relief Act in 1601.68 In light of the
rising costs of Medicaid,69 using Virginia Code section 20-88 as an
alternative may seem to be an appropriate method to trim the
state's budget. It is difficult to ignore the financial stress on government as baby boomers become aged and infirm, while the
younger generation appears unable to carry these costs." Although no such record of Virginia's legislative intent for passing
section 20-88 exists, based on similar statutes' interpretations in
other jurisdictions, one can assume this to be a primary justification.7 1 Some even attribute the rise of government programs aiding the needy as a direct result of failure to implement or enforce
filial responsibility statutes.7 2
Others argue that despite having economic justification, in reality, the administrative burden to implement such statutes far
outweigh the benefit.7 3 Determining, among other things, whether
a parent is in "necessitous circumstances," a child has the financial ability, or whether a parent's historic conduct rose to the level
of "desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure to support," is a
complex factual determination. Determining such elements will
create an "administrative nightmare," outweighing any benefit
the state may devise from the law. 4

68. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 55.
69. See Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Costs Rise, but Some States Are Spared, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/us/medicaid-costs-rise-reportsays-but-not-more-than-most-states-expected.html?_r=0 (discussing rising costs of Medicaid due to its expansion of coverage under the Affordable Care Act).
70. See Matthew Pakula, The Legal Responsibility of Adult Children to Care for Indigent Parents,NAT. CTR. FOR POLY ANALYSIS (July 12, 2005), www.ncpa.org/publba521.
71. See, e.g., Pickett v. Pickett, 251 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind. App. Ct. 1969) ("We believe
the intent of the General Assembly ... was to relieve the general public of liability for
support of thosc individuals who havc children financially able to contribute to thoir
maintenance and support...").
72. See Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statutc: A Uniform Tool to
Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859, 868 (2005).
73. The administrative burden filial support laws may cause is discussed infra Part
Ill.E.
74. See Park, supranote 9, at 456.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
A. ContravenesPublic Policy
Few deny that providing a safety net for the old and indigent is
an important policy the Commonwealth should stand behind. Enforcing filial support statutes create the effect of greater "equality
of treatment among" an older generation, but carry the unintended consequence of unequally burdening their children.15 This
leads to the inquiry of whether it is fair to force children who,
through no fault of their own, have indigent parents, while those
with parents who adequately prepared for old age bear no responsibility. This idea may also undermine the traditional public policy of maximizing individual autonomy. 6 Historically, the United
States dislikes impinging on an individuals' freedom unless a
"compelling" justification exists for doing so." Thus, there exists a
tension between the two policies, retaining individual autonomy
versus supporting the old and indigent.
Opponents of filial responsibility have challenged the laws'
constitutionality. 8 These challenges have been unsuccessful, likely because "[n]o quasi-suspect classification or fundamental right"
was at stake, leaving courts unable to use a heightened scrutiny
standard, but rather only evaluate the laws under a "rational basis analysis."79 For example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
believed having an indigent parent was a rational enough reason
to implement financial liability.' These failed challenges only
prove that filial responsibility laws will probably withstand most
constitutional challenges, not that the laws are fair.8 1

75. W. Walton Garrett, FilialResponsibility Laws, 18 J. FAM. L. 793, 817 (1979).
76. See B. GUY PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 470
(10th ed. 2015).
77. Id. at 470-71 (referencing protecting children and the mentally incompetent is
usually a justifiable "compelling' reason to erode one's individual autonomy).
78. See, e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 572 (S.D. 1994);
Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 847 (Ca. 1973); Maricopa Cty. v. Douglas, 208 P.2d
646, 649 (Ariz. 1949).
79. Randall, 513 N.W.2d at 572.
80. Id.
81. Constitutional violations are evaluated on a higher standard than simple fairness.
For onamplo, to argue a successful duo process violation under the United States Conotitu
tion, one must argue the state actor'o culpability to be at least intentional. Sec Cty. of Sac
ramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998) (noting the "Constitution does not guaran-
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Unlike in the seventeenth century, when England first enacted
its filial responsibility law, or in 1920 when Virginia enacted its
own, it is no longer the trend for families to live in close proximity
to each other.8 2 Virginia Code section 20-88 is more sensible when
applied to a community where children stay in the same locality
as parents. Unlike the more agrarian society of the past, members of the millennial generation are less inclined to remain in
the community in which they grew up.8" In this modern society,
filial responsibility laws tend to apply inequitably to the poor and
less-educated who lack the means to move around.' Previously,
society deemed it important for children to support parents into
old age.8" Today, our social norms may have shifted.86
Some argue filial responsibility laws actually break down family relationships, not promote them.8 7 This is because the laws only
require financial support, not the physical or emotional support
that typically comes with voluntary care.88 The federal government adopted this view when creating Medicare and Medicaid."
Where no voluntary care of a parent exists, there is likely a
strained parent-child relationship; that tension becomes exacerbated when a child is forced de jure to support a parent. Such retee due care on the part of state officials" but requires a higher threshold of liability).
82. Rosenbaum, supranote 22, at 66.
83. See Millennials Continue UrbanizationLeaving Small Towns, NPR (Oct. 21, 2014,
6:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/21/357723069/millennials-continue-urbanization-ofamerica-leaving-small-towns (discussing large growth of educated millennials moving
away from small towns to big metropolitan areas); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at
66 ("Aherc formerly parento and children were apt to ohare a houoe or farm, today the
trend is to establish independent households instead of sharing homes with relatives.").
84. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 66 (noting how "responsibility laws tend to
make the poor or the near-poor live together rather than establish independent households" like their wealthier peers).
85. History and American Studies Professor Hendrik Hartog at Princeton explains
how nineteenth-century parents were reliant on children for care, forcing them to promise
an inheritance in return. See Stephen J. Dubner, Should Kids Pay Back Their Parents for Raising Them?, FREAKONOMICS (Oct. 8, 2015, 10:16 AM), http://freakonomics.
com/podcast/should-kids-pay-back-their-parents-for-raising-them-a-new-freakonomics-rad
io-episode/.
86. See id. (noting how parento are no longer as dependent on adult ohildron today
due to the rise of private pensions and Social Security).
87. Park, supra note 9, at 454-55.
88. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 344 ("[Flilial responsibility laws do not address
the fundamental need that all persons, and most especially the vulnerable elderly, have to
be supported by caring relationships.") (emphasis added).
89. See S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2018 ("Beyond [parents being accountable to children, familial] requirements imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among members of the family group.").
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sentment may be more likely to damage a family relationship rather than heal what was already broken.
Filial responsibility laws may be rarely enforced due to the unease many feel about using legal recourse as an appropriate remedy.9" Some states, such as Virginia, permit government officials
to prosecute individuals who fail to pay funds under filial responsibility statutes." Americans tend to believe there are more important duties for prosecutors besides "forcing people to support
their aged relatives against their will."9 Virginia's implementation of section 20-88 so far has only involved private actions;
there are no recorded cases of the Commonwealth suing an adultchild on behalf of an agency. One could speculate that the unwillingness of the Commonwealth to enforce a law may be due to its
misalignment with general public policy concerns."
B. Lack of Uniformity
The lack of uniformity regarding codified filial responsibility
across the country makes it inherently unfair and difficult to implement. Regulating the family is an area of law typically delegated to the states.94 The obligation to support a parent is statutorily created;9 5 thus, states vary widely on whether they require
parental support, and if they do, what that encompasses.96 Stay-

90. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 61-62 (citing FLOYD A. BOND ET AL., OUR
NEEDY AGED: A CALIFORNIA STUDY OF A NATIONAL PROBLEM 200 (1954)).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016) ("A proceeding may be instituted ...in
the name of the Commonwcalth by the otate agency administering the program of aosistance or soricoo in order to compel any child of a parent receiving ouch assistance or Der
vices to reimburse the Commonwealth.').
92. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
BOND ET AL., supra note 90, at 200).
93. Enforcement would probably come from the Office of the Attorney General, who
may be reluctant to enforce ouch laws for political rcasons. Sce id. (noting the reason for
infrequont court decisions is the reluctance of elected officials to force people to support
relatives against their will).
94. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting the government's
"national productivity ' reasoning out of concern that allowing "Congreoo [to] regulate any
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens [could
lead to its regulation of] family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody)," an
area of law usually regulated by the states).
95. Pearson, supra note 29, at 278 (citing Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512, 514 (1861))
(distinguishing the common law duty of a parent to support offspring from the otatutorily
created duty of a child to support parents).
96. See id. at 304 (providing table of fifty states including whether the state contains a
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ing in the same state as one's parents is no longer the norm as

Americans have become "highly mobile and increasingly transient."97 The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to speak to whether
section 20-88 applies to non-Virginians. Meanwhile, other states
have ruled differently on whether sister states' filial responsibility laws are applicable to their own residents.98 It is unclear
whether Virginia courts have jurisdiction over non-resident children in the increasingly common situation where children reside
in different states.
Until 1992, state child support laws experienced the same issue.99 It was only federal intervention that allowed state child
support obligations to become uniformly enforced in all fifty
states."°° The Child Support Recovery Act ("CSRA") was passed to
stabilize "the economic security of children of divorced parents" ''
by holding such "deadbeat parents" accountable. 2 Although child
support is a family law issue, members of Congress characterized
the law in terms of economics. Senator D'Amato noted how CSRA
aimed to "secure [the country's] economic foundation": its children.0 3 Senator Schumer prefaced the bill as not purporting to
satisfy a moral obligation, but rather to stop American children
' 4 At the state level, child
and taxpayers from being "robbed."'
support laws and filial support laws serve the same purpose: both
filial support law and if so, the case law interpreting it).
97. Harkness, supranote 36, at 316-17.
98. Compare California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. 1958) (enforcing California filial responsibility law in Texas), with Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Assistance v.
Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33-34 (not enforcing Pennsylvania law where it conflicted with Ohio
statute).
99. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S7236 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato) (noting the "tragic practice of delinquency" when fathers flee to another state to
avoid paying child support); CriminalPenalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in
Child Support: Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice,
102nd Cong. 28 (1992) (statement of Harry W. Wiggins, Dir., Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Div.
of Child Support Enflt) ("States are unable to effectively work together due to widely differing State regulations and laws.").
100. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
101. 138 CONG. REC. S16449 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
102. Statement on Signing the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 2122 (Oct. 25, 1992).
103. 137 CONG. REC. S7236-37 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
104. Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support:
Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102nd Cong.
1-2 (1992) ("[P]eople who have good families, together families, nothing to do with child
support themselves, are directly affected, because the taxpayer is robbed of billions of dollars when the children's mothers can't make ends meet and are forced to rely on welfare.").
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enforce a financial obligation on a private person rather than on
the state.
The federal government might find difficulty passing a law
similar to CSRA to enforce other states' filial support laws. Our
culture tends to view "deadbeat parents" who escape child support obligations as "culpable" and the children to whom money is
owed as blameless. 01 5 In contrast, characterizing adult children
who escape liability for parents as "deadbeats" seems odd and unjustified,"°6 especially if they have endured a strained emotional
parent-child relationship. Further, unlike the child support scenario, in many cases, the parent seeking support from the child
may be to blame for his or her financial shortcomings, °7 differing
greatly from the innocent child who is, by definition, completely
dependent upon his parents. The basis for protecting our children, something most Americans agree on, does not smoothly extend into an artificial scheme for parental support.
States could potentially fix the enforcement problem without
the federal government's aid. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"), which Virginia, along
with its forty-nine sister states, adopted in 1994.08 Thus, if
UIFSA were amended to extend beyond child support to include
any type of family support, this inequity could be remedied.
Again, however, such a move is unlikely, as UIFSA is based upon
the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which
limits its application to child and spousal support.0 9 Independent-

105. See id. at 2.
106. See supra Part Ill.A.
107. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (mother fled nursing home bill to move to Greece); Amber Spataro, 'Prodigal Parent"as a Defense to Proceedings Brought To Require Support from a Child, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 385 (2000) (providing the example of Hal and Wanda, who
retired at sixty-five and spent frivolously, leading them to sue their children for support
ten years later).
108.

UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2008) (explaining

that all states adopted UIFSA); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1992) (changing name from Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act); Lawrence D.
Diehl, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act: A PracticalUpdate, VA. LAW., Feb. 2001, at
24, http://www.vsb.org/docs/valawyermagazine/feb01diehl.pdf (discussing Virginia's codification of UIFSA).
109. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance,Art. 2 (Nov. 23, 2007),
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ly amending UIFSA to include parental support is unlikely for
the same reasons Congress has not extended CSRA to parental
support. The public outcry to care for children is just not the
same when it comes to aging parents. Even if UIFSA were
amended to include parental support, it would not ameliorate the
issue of consistency. One of the issues prompting CSRA's passage
was the Uniform Reciprocal Act's inability to make child support
enforcement uniform. 110
C. ConstitutionalConcerns
As discussed above, despite the inequities filial support laws
may impose, such laws have generally survived constitutional
challenges."' Virginia's filial responsibility law, however, may violate the U.S. Constitution as applied. Among the various plaintiffs who have challenged filial responsibility laws in other
states,"2 some have argued such laws violate individuals' due process rights, both substantive and procedural."' Others have argued the laws violate the Equal Protection Clause on various
grounds."4 These challenges have largely been denied because
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/14e71887-0090-47a3-9c49-d438eb601b47.pdf.
110. See Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support.
Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102nd Cong.
29 (1992).
111. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 572 (S.D. 1994);
Swoap v. Super. Ct., 516 P.2d 840, 847 (Cal. 1973); Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Assistance v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33-34 (Ohio 1954); Maricopa Cty. v. Douglas, 208 P.2d
646, 649 (Ariz. 1949); Morris Cty. Welfare Bd. v. Gilligan, 31 A.2d 805, 806 (N.J. 1943).
113. Courts have largely upheld such laws. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 128 N.E.2d 3, 7
(Ohio 1955) (explaining the law's rational "purpose ... is to create, as between parents
and adult children, a legal obligation which previously was only a moral one reoting upon
close blood relationships and humanitarian considerations."). But see Gilligan, 31 A.2d at
806 (upholding challenge to procedural due process where notice was not required by the
statute).
114. Such Equal Protection challenges include arguments that filial support laws unequally burden children of the indigent by "double taxing" them, claiming defendants paid
taxes to provide for other aged individuals plus their own, see Douglas, 208 P.2d at 649,
and also by irrationally basing liability on involuntary biological relationships, see Swoap,
516 P.2d at 851. State courts found both reasons to survive a rational basis test. In Swoap,
the court also struck the plaintiffs' challenge to California's law based on impermissible
classification by wealth. Id. at 850 (noting the law draws no distinction among wealthy
versus poor children). While Virginia Code section 20-88 does draw a line based on wealth
by determining whether the child is "of sufficient earning capacity" before establishing
liability, classification based on wealth should still survive the "rational basis" test. See
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("[A]t least where wealth
is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely
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courts tend to reason such laws have a rational basis. However,
there are no known Equal Protection claims arguing that a filial
responsibility law irrationally places a burden on one child in one
state but not a sibling residing in another state.
The Ohio Supreme Court held Pennsylvania's filial responsibility law, as applied to an Ohio resident, violated the Equal Protection Clause due to differences in state law. 1 ' In Mong, an Ohio
resident was sued under Pennsylvania's filial responsibility lawwhich, unlike the Ohio version, did not include the defense of
abandonment." 6 The court deemed it unconstitutionally unequal
to hold the defendant liable under the Pennsylvania law but not
under Ohio law, where his evidence of abandonment would have
likely permitted an escape from liability." 7 Mong demonstrates
how a potential challenge to Virginia Code section 20-88 based on
classifying persons by residency-in-state siblings being liable
versus out-of-state siblings not being liable-may hold sway in
court. Virginia's law provides joint and several liability; this
leaves the possibility of requiring 100 percent of the financial
burden to fall on the in-state child, while his or her sibling living
outside the Commonwealth pays nothing.
D. Conflicts with FederalLaw
All Americans aged sixty-five and over are eligible for Medicare, a federal government program paying for certain medical
expenses."' Medicaid, in contrast, is a program implemented
through the state with aid from the federal government; it covers
citizens based on need rather than age."'
The 1965 Social Security Act Amendments, which established
Medicare and Medicaid, limit the scope of the Commonwealth's
filial responsibility law so that it will likely only apply to a parent's non-medical expenses. This is because Virginia must comply
with federal rules to qualify for federal Medicaid funding which,
equal advantages.").
115. Mong, 117 N.E.2d at 33-34.
116. Id. at 33.
117. Id. at 33-34.
118. Medicare and Medicaid, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.
hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
119. Id.
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expressly prohibit taking into account the applicant's relatives'
120
(except for the spouse) financial means to determine eligibility.
Congress created this exemption out of concern that taking nonspousal relatives into account would be "destructive and harmful
to the relationships among members of the family group.' 2 '
Virginia Code section 20-88 will only apply to a person in "necessitous circumstances."'22 Although the standard put forth by
Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton has not been tested since
1938, under that precedent, Virginia interprets the element to
mean a child is only liable where the parent is "living in or characterized by poverty.'' 123 It would therefore be unlikely for one to
qualify under section 20-88 but not qualify under Medicaid. For
these reasons, where a parent is in "necessitous circumstances,"
he or she would likely apply for Medicaid coverage rather than
turn to litigation against a child. So in reality, under the 1965
Medicaid Social Security Act Amendments, Virginia's filial responsibility law should only cover non-medical expenses. A parent could qualify for Medicaid and attempt to use the statute to
require a child to pay for non-Medicaid-covered expensesperhaps an arguably nicer nursing home than one accepting Medicaid payment-however, such a scenario would
4 probably not sat12
isfy the "necessitous circumstances" element.
Virginia allows a state agency providing assistance or services
to sue the parent's child for reimbursement under Virginia Code
section 20-88."' Most case law involving various filial responsibility statutes arise from a parent being unable to pay the bill for

120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2012) (prohibiting states from "tak[ing] into account the
financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant... unless ... such individual's
spouse or such individual's child who is under age 21 or ... is blind or permanently and
totally disabled); 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(1) (2015) ("Except for a spouse ... or ... a child
who is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not consider income and resources of any relative as available to an individual. ') (emphasis added).
121. S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2018.
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
123. 171 Va. 255, 262-63, 198 S.E. 496, 499.
124. A Newport News JDR judge ruled this way when he held the parent was not in
"necessitous circumstances" since she was able to be in a nicer assisted living facility;
thus, section 20-88 was inapplicable. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra
note 5.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). It also provides that if the parent is institutionalized, the children cannot be liable for more than sixty months of institutionalization. Id.
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the nursing home or medical care center. 126 Nursing homes are a
recent phenomenon, only coming about in the twentieth century
and becoming even more popular after the 1965 passage of Medicare and Medicaid.'27 Providing care for the elderly today often
comes in the form of nursing home expenses, if not hospital expenses.128 The rising cost of nursing homes, which include medical
expenses, 129 have exacerbated the growing issue of the elderly's
quickening depletion of funds. 3 ° It follows that Virginia's filial
support law typically comes into play when dealing with a parent's medical or health-related expenses, especially nursing
homes.'3 ' This creates a conundrum: the elderly need the most financial support with regard to medical expenses, but section 2088 covers the same medical expenses as Medicaid.
Not only does federal law prohibit taking into account adult
children's finances when determining Medicaid eligibility, it also
expressly prohibits nursing homes funded by Medicaid or Medicare from requiring a third party to guarantee payment as a condition of admission.'32 The Department of Health and Human
Services interpreted this requirement as not allowing any person,
even one with legal access to the resident's income, to be held
personally financially liable.'3 3 This federal regulation should bar
any claim by a nursing home certified by Medicare or Medicaid
against a private person under section 20-88. Thus, combined
126. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (nursing home sued son to pay for mother's expenses); Prairie Lakes Heath
Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D. 1998) (hospital sued son to pay for
the parents' medical expenses); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1147
(R.I. 1994) (Medical Center suing daughter for parents' medical expenses).
127. The History of Nursing Homes, FATE: FOUNDATION AIDING THE ELDERLY, www.
4fate.org/history.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
128. See id.
129. Federal law defines a "nursing facility" as one that primarily provides "healthrelated care and services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) (2012).
130. See Brandon, supra note 12.
131. All Virginia attorneys interviewed about their experiences with section 20-88
spoke about situations involving children paying for parents' medical expenses. See Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with R. Shawn
Majette, supra note 5; Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3; Telephone
Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2012).
133. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(2) (2015) (permitting "an individual who has legal access to a
resident's income... to provide facility payment from the resident's income or resources"
but not allowing the institution to hold her personally financially liable). The author
thanks Kathy Pryor for pointing out this conflict. Telephone interview with Kathy Pryor,
supra note 7.
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with the federal prohibition against evaluating an adult child's
income in deciding Medicaid eligibility, Virginia's filial responsibility statute becomes effectively useless.
E. Administrative Nightmare
Virginia Code section 20-88 imposes liability on a case-by-case
basis. Among other things, a court must determine whether the
parent is truly in "necessitous circumstances," the child has "sufficient earning capacity or income," and-if a defense should apply-whether "there is substantial evidence of desertion, neglect,
' This indicates that parties
abuse, or willful failure to support."134
must spend time and money gathering evidence to support their
positions to sway a fact-finder. Some argue these reasons make
enforcing filial responsibility essentially an "administrative
nightmare."'35 This is because enforcement of the law could cost
the government more money to implement than it would save the
government overall.' Although California repealed its filial responsibility statute in 1975, 37 its original law contained a formula
to determine the amount of money a child would provide a parent,
depending on the adult-child's income level, and gave a state
agency the power to make the determination.'3 8 A 1950s California survey concluded that most welfare agencies found implementing its filial responsibility law cost them more than the law
saved them.'39
Currently, Virginia Code section 20-88 does not allocate responsibility to a specific agency to determine liability but leaves it
to the courts. 4 ' Similar to the Department of Medical Assistance
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
135. See, e.g., Park, supra note 9, at 456.
136. Id.; see, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 59 ("Since the major policy consideration behind the relative responsibility laws is to guard the public purse, the policy would
be seriously undermined if, in fact, the administrative costs of collecting money from the
legally responsible family outweighed the monies saved by the state in the form of lower
welfare payments.").
137. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (West 2016); see 22 CAL. L. REV. COMM.
REPORTS 1 (1992) (noting section 12350 substituted the former Civil Code section 206
which provided filial liability).
138. Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall: The Renaissanceof Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. REV. 518, 540 n.230-31 (1995) (citing Swoap v. Superior
Court, 516 P.2d 840, 842 n.3 (Ca. 1973)).
139. Rosenbaum, supranote 22, at 59.
140. Virginia Code section 20-88 gives state agencies the right to file suit under the
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Services's ("DMAS") ability to examine whether a person is qualified to receive Medicaid,' 1 the Commonwealth could delegate this
complex fact-finding mission to a specific Virginia agency rather
than clogging up the courts.
In 1983, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)"4 '
estimated enforcing state filial responsibility laws would reduce
Medicaid spending by about twenty-five million dollars. 4' This estimate proved untrue after Idaho conducted a program in 1984 to
enforce its filial support laws, raising only about $32,000 instead
of the expected $1.5 million.' The Idaho study may not equally
translate elsewhere, but it does note the limited impact such laws
may have. Even if the 1983 estimation was accurate, providing
could save
for inflation,' the amount filial responsibility statutes
46
still would not substantially reduce Medicaid costs.
Some argue longer life-spans and population growth have led
to Medicaid spending becoming too high to remain sustainable.' 7
Yet, effective implementation of Virginia Code section 20-88
would likely not even offset nursing home costs,' 8 leaving the potential reduction to Medicaid insignificant. As Northern Virginia
attorney Yahne Miorini noted, the cost of healthcare today is so
high that an adult child's contribution, which would certainly be
in a similar range as child support, would be "just a drop in the
49
bucket.'

statute, but determining applicability of the otatute ioone for judicial determination. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-324.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
142. The HCFA was created in 1977 for the purpose of providing oversight of
Medicare and the federal portion of Medicaid. Health Care Finance Administration,
FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-care-finance-admini
stration (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
143. See Pakula, supra note 70.
144. Kline, supra note 19, at 204 (citing ALICE M. RIvLiN & JOSHUA M. WIENER,
CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 173 (1988)).
145. The $25,000,000 estimated in 1983 would amount to about $60,000,000 today. See
The Inflation Calculator,WESTEGG, http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Oct. 4,
2016).
146. In 2015, the budget for Medicaid amounted to about $331.4 billion. HHS FY2015
Budget in Brief, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/aboutfbudget/fy20l5fbudget-in-brief/cms/
index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
147. See Sisaket, supra note 53, at 83.
148. See supra Part III.D.
149. Telephone Interview with Yahne Miorini, Attorney, Miorini Law, PLLC (Apr. 5,
2016).
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F. Potentialfor Abuse
Of course, if a person never applies for Medicaid, the federal
rule precluding evaluation of a family's finances does not exist.
On one hand, this means there are circumstances where Virginia
Code section 20-88 is useful; on the other hand, this indicates potential abuse of the statute. Virginia's filial responsibility only extends to where the parent is in "necessitous circumstances."
There are few circumstances in which one might be deemed in
"necessitous circumstances" yet not qualify for Medicaid. 15 0 It follows that Virginia Code section 20-88, except for unusual circumstances,"' should only be utilized where the parent needs funds
for non-medical purposes such as food and shelter. If a parent
could otherwise qualify for Medicaid, he or she may be using the
statute for a non-meritorious purpose.
Recent Virginia cases indicate that Virginia Code section 20-88
has been used more as a weapon of intra-family rivalries than for
meritorious purposes. In a Virginia Beach case, the children of a
woman suffering from dementia attempted to establish guardianship of their mother. However, their stepfather objected and insisted on keeping her at an assisted living facility, despite the
substantial drain on her assets. 1 2 The woman's children, as well
as her guardian ad litem, had recommended applying for Medicaid relief and transferring her to a Medicaid-funded, skilled
nursing facility that would better fit her needs. However, the
stepfather disagreed."' In retaliation, he filed suit against the
children under section 20-88." The JDR judge ordered the children to pay the assisted living facility bills."' Before reaching the
merits on appeal, the Circuit Court judge ordered the stepfather
M

150. See supra note 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing today's ambiguous
standard for "necessitous circumstances").
151. There arc situationo whcrc a peroon qualifico for Medicaid and a parent'r "nocoeci
tous circumstances" include expenses that Medicaid would not cover. In attorney Kathy
Pryor'o caoc, her client's ninety-seven year old mother opoko little English and had oevre
dementia, causing her to inccooantly ocrcam. The nuroing home discharged her becauo
they could not comply with her needs, forcing the client and her husband to physically and
financially care for their mother, beyond the hours of care provided by Medicaid. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supranote 7.
152. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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to apply for Medicaid benefits using the necessary documentation, and the application was approved." 6 The mother was then
transferred to the Medicaid-funded nursing facility, as requested
by the children and over the objection of the stepfather, with no
additional expenses accruing to the children or stepfather once
the transfer took place.' 7 Because the mother's future costs were
no longer an issue that needed to be litigated-as the payment of
her living expenses had been resolved through the intervention of
Medicaid-the parties settled, but not without incurring substantial legal fees.' 59
Another case arising out of Southeastern Virginia involved a
mother who could no longer pay her nursing home fees."6° Her
daughter, the defendant, had been physically caring for her over
the past ten years while her son, a Charlottesville lawyer, had
been in charge of her finances.' After allegedly misappropriating
her funds, the brother sued himself and his sister on the mother's
behalf.'62 The daughter was not held liable because the mother
was not in "necessitous circumstances," as she had sufficient Social Security and military retirement funds left by her late husband. 63 Still, the daughter incurred substantial legal fees.'
A Newport News man with a substantial income also used section 20-88 to sue his brother, an auto mechanic, because he became tired of carrying a heavier burden in paying the parent's assisted living facility bill.' 6' The defendant argued the parent was
not in "necessitous circumstances," as evidenced by the nice facility in which she lived." The JDR judge agreed and dismissed the
6
suit.1 1
In all of these cases, one private person was using the statute
to obtain money from another private person, who did not cause
156. Id.
157. Id.
159. Id.
160. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supranote 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (estimating he spent around twenty to thirty hours researching this case due
to the novel issues presented and lack of clear precedent).
165. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supranote 5.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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the financial need in the first place. However, other states such
as Pennsylvania and South Dakota have used their filial responsibility statutes to allow nursing homes to recover funds from private persons.168 Virginia Poverty Law Center attorney Kathy
Pryor noted her concern that this would start to happen in Virginia. 9 She also expressed concern about the effect this would
have on those who cannot afford a lawyer and choose to represent
themselves pro se, without awareness of legal defenses available
to them. 7 ' Because judges seem equally unaware of section 2088,1" such individuals would likely lack a competent defense and
be vulnerable to liability for large nursing home debt. In most
cases where a strong family relationship exists, children who can
afford to provide for their parents will do so voluntarily.7 2 But
under the present statutory scheme, there are few mechanisms in
place to stop private parties from using the law as a sword for
vengeful purposes.
IV. WHY VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 20-88 MUST BE REPEALED OR
AMENDED
73
While filial responsibility laws have various justifications,
none of them appear sufficient to overcome the unequal treatment they can produce. The strongest incentive for keeping Virginia Code section 20-88 is the burden pressed upon the state if
there is no private payment. The policy of using de jure filial support as a mechanism to save taxpayer dollars, while valid in theory, is no longer practical, as it is outweighed by the public policies
of maximizing individual autonomy, equal treatment, and avoiding potential abuse."'

168. See Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012); Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D.
1998).
169. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supranote 7. She further noted how allowing nursing homes to sue private individuals using state filial responsibility statues conflicts with federal law regulating Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing facilities. Id.;
see also supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
170. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supranote 7.
171. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3.
172. See Elkins, supra note 11.
173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra Part III.
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A. Section 20-88 Can Only Be Justified as a Tool to Ease
Government Costs
The purposes for filial support laws, beyond saving taxpayer
money, are limited at best. Virginia cannot justify imposing a legal obligation on adult children to support parents based on an
implicit contract created in exchange for their parents' support
during their minority years. Courts are reluctant to uphold an
implicit parent-child contract because they see it as more of a
moral obligation.175 Minors may contract for certain necessities
such as food and education in Virginia," 6 however this concept
has yet to be, nor should be, applied to an implicit contract with a
parent.
Few would argue society has abandoned the moral duty to support one's parents. Yet, moral obligations do not always, and
should not always, become per se legal obligations. The Supreme
Court confirmed this policy in Lawrence v. Texas, where it found
preserving an individual's right to privacy outweighed a legislature's moral viewpoint; the Court explained, "the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice."'77
Of course, one may argue that child support enforcement laws
evoke a similar moral duty to care for those who cannot care for
themselves. But, the protected group, minor children, differs
greatly from older adults. The obligation to all children by society
is different than the obligation of society to older adults, with
varying income, assets, health, and relations with their children. ' American society also views those evading child support

175. See, e.g., Graham v. Morrison, 607 S.E.2d 295, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) ("Past
consideration or moral obligation is not adequate consideration to support a contract.");
Jacobs v. Church, 36 Va. Cir. 277, 279 (1995) (Spotsylvania County) ('It is settled that in
the absence of an express contract a child cannot recover for services rendered a parent,
the presumption being that such services were performed in recognition of a filial duty.').
176. See Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 608, 561 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2002) (upholding a
contract entered by a minor where it is "within the general class of necessities").
177. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (referring to an unconstitutional
Texas statute that criminalized two persons of the same sex consensually engaging in sex
in their home).
178. See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012) (reinforcing support for all children).
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as impinging on America's "economic foundation," viewing children as the building blocks of the future.17 9
Even if the duty to support one's parents is a worthy goal, it is
in direct conflict with an even more important public policy: protecting individual autonomy."8 American social norms have shifted since the Elizabethan era when the filial responsibility laws
were first enacted. Many view forcing children to support their
parents as antiquated, from a past era when children lived in the
same household as their parents through adulthood. 8 '
Finally, even if the moral purpose to care for the indigent and
elderly were sufficient to create a legal obligation, the United
States has usurped that purpose through the creation of Medicare
and Medicaid.182 The government could never rely solely on filial
responsibility statutes to provide for the elderly because they are
under-inclusive: such laws do not provide for those with no children, those with children who have predeceased them, or those
whose children are indigent." 3 Medicaid and Medicare have become fixtures in American society, creating a safety net for all
Americans who cannot afford to take care of themselves.
Because easing the financial burden of the state remains the
sole valid justification behind parental support statutes, only this
reason should be weighed against the countervailing policies.
B. Section 20-88 No Longer Works in Practice
The next inquiry becomes whether Virginia should enforce section 20-88 to lessen the burden on the state's expenditure of Medicaid. For Medicaid and Filial Responsibility laws to truly work in
harmony, DMAS would have to take into account whether the filial responsibility statute applies when determining Medicaid eligibility. This would entail analyzing the adult child's earnings
and the personal history of the parent-child relationship.' The
179. See 137 CONG. REC. S7236-04 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
180. Cf. Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 42, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2005) (finding Virginia
fornication statute failed rational basis test because an "intrusion upon a person's liberty
interest" outweighed the moral purpose proffered by the government).
181. See Rosenbaum, supranote 22, at 66.
182. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
183. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 328.
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (enforcing only where the child has
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first problem this poses relates to a federal statute prohibiting
DMAS from taking into account a child's income.185 Thus, successful implementation would require amending the federal statute.
As noted previously, Congress is unlikely to tackle such a political
bombshell. 8 ' Second, the administrative cost for DMAS to deter87
mine whether the statutory defenses apply would be exorbitant.
DMAS would have to pry into the personal family histories of its
applicants, adding to the already burdensome amount of time and
money required to obtain coverage.
Some argue Medicaid should take into account the finances of
an applicant's children, as many recipients hide their assets
through inter vivos trusts, making them eligible for Medicaid,
when in reality they have sheltered assets for their children.'8 8
While this is a strong argument to permit evaluating children's
assets, the federal government deems protecting the family relationship to be more important. 88 So unless the federal government changes its Medicaid compliance requirements, Virginia can
do nothing to close that loophole.
Even in situations in which a person is on Medicaid, yet remains in "necessitous circumstances,"'' federal law still prohibits
nursing homes certified by Medicare or Medicaid to hold a third
party personally financially liable.'' Ironically, one of the main
reasons the elderly become impoverished is the tremendous cost
of healthcare incurred due to aging.' Unfortunately, save a few
circumstances, federal law prohibits Virginia Code section 20-88
from resolving this issue.
"sufficient earning capacity or income" and providing defenses of "desertion, neglect, abuse
or willful failure to support").
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (2012).
186. See supra Part llI.B (discussing why the federal government is unlikely to pass a
law enforcing filial support that is akin to CSRA).
187. See supra Part III.E.
188. See Matthew Pakula, The Legal Responsibility of Adult Children to Care for Indigent Parents,NAT. CTR. FOR POLY ANALYSIS (July 12, 2005), www.ncpa.org/publba521.
189. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
190. This was the case in which the petitioner's mother was on Medicaid, but due to
her English deficioncy and dementia, facilities wcre unable to providc hcr with adequate
care. This forcod her daughter to provide at-home care, which Medicaid did not fully covei:
for the number of hours needed. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 5.
191. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
192. See Brandon, supra note 12 (noting that 70 percent of retirees who are in poverty
suffer from acute health conditions).
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C. Is Keeping Filial Responsibility Worth it?
Gaps may exist where a parent is not eligible for Medicaid but
is still in "necessitous circumstances." So, next the question becomes whether Virginia Code section 20-88 should remain on the
books to cover such situations. The justification for imposing liability on innocent adults must be weighed against countervailing
policies, such as protecting individual autonomy and equal treatment under the law.'93 In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the
potential for section 20-88 to unintentionally become a vehicle for
litigating sour family relationships.
Whether a state can force an individual to pay for a parent's
needs should depend on what caused the parent's poor financial
situation. There are circumstances where assisted living facilities
and skilled nursing homes maintain non-Medicaid-covered residents, but because of the parent's poor planning or past folly, the
parents can no longer foot the bill.' As it stands, section 20-88
does not take into account the cause of the parent's financial necessity. However, it is unfair to hold innocent children financially
liable for their parent's poor decisions. Last year, a Maryland legislator who was concerned about the law's fairness, unsuccessfully attempted to amend Maryland's filial responsibility law. He
pointed out the inequity in holding children "legally responsible
for payment" when "[p]arents are able to incur bills and expenses
without their children having a say."' 9
Filial responsibility imposes an unequal burden among citizens. A child may be liable for her parent's expenses while a sibling owes no legal obligation simply because he lives in a state
without a similar law. Virginia cannot control whether other
states will hold their residents liable under section 20-88. 96 This

193. See supraPart III.
194. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (mother left nursing home debt and moved to Greece); Prairie Lakes Health
Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D. 1998) (parents conveyed real estate
to children to avoid paying nursing home bill). It should be noted that since most nursing
homes are certified by Medicare or Medicaid, federal law's prohibition on admitting residents in reliance on a third-party guarantee disqualifies the majority of nursing homes
from bringing a suit such as in Pittas.See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
195. H.B. 924, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015).
196. See Commonwealth v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33-34 (Ohio 1954) (holding that Ohio
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leads to the unjust result of filial responsibility impacting the less
educated and poorer families.'9 7 This higher burden on the poor
typically arises because families with higher education and
wealth are more likely to move elsewhere to seek economic opportunities, education, and changes in lifestyle.'9 8
Virginia's filial responsibility statute carries a large potential
for abuse.'9 9 Other states' interpretations of their filial responsibility laws have varied widely, leaving any suit based on the statute completely unpredictable.2 ' In 2013, AARP estimated that
about forty million Americans voluntarily provided an estimated
economic value of approximately $470 billion to a family member-up from the estimated $450 billion in 2009."°1 This number
is actually larger than the amount of money the federal government spent on Medicaid that same year.2"2 Thus, it appears most
Americans do voluntarily care for their aging parents. The uptick in voluntary care may be attributable to the fact that Americans are living longer now more than ever.0 4
There are numerous reasons a child might not provide for his
or her parent. This may include the statutorily acceptable excuse
of abandoning the child during youth, or it may simply be due to
a lack of an emotional bond. A parent's actions may not have risen to the level of "desertion," but nevertheless may have caused a
strained parent-child relationship. It is in these adversarial circumstances a filial responsibility statute would be most inequitable.
Finally, in the recent cases involving Virginia's filial responsibility statute, it has not been the parent-child relationship that
prompted the lawsuit; rather, it has been the tangential relation-

law, not Pennsylvania, would determine the liability of an Ohio resident sued under the
Pennsylvania filial responsibility statute).
197. See Rosenbaum, supranote 22, at 66.
198. See id.; see also Compton & Pollak, supra note 13, at 35-36 (showing an increase
in correlation between college educated children and proximity of parents).
199. See infra Part IJI.F.
200. See Elkins, supranote 11.
201. REINHARD ET AL., supra note 56, at 1.
202. Id. at 3.
203. See id. at 1.
204. See LINDSEY M. HOWDEN & JuLIE A- MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX
COMPOSITION: 2010 1, 2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20l0lbriefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
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ships between other family members that have caused section 2088 to be used as a tool for retaliation.2 °5 Virginia should not permit its laws to be used in such an unmeritorious fashion and
must repeal or change the law to prevent similar claims from occurring.
D. Should Virginia Follow Others in Repealing the Statute?
England repealed its filial responsibility statute from which
section 20-88 is derived in 1948.20 6 Parliament was reacting to a
social-norm shift; it repealed the duty to support parents while
simultaneously reaffirming the obligation to support children." 7
As Medicaid came into the picture in the United States as "the
dominant focus of relief for the poor," states started to also repeal
filial responsibility statutes.2 8
Some states viewed the passage of Medicare and Medicaid as
purporting to alleviate "an often heavy burden on those obligated
to pay for assistance under existing State laws."2 9 So, the same
public policy of providing for the aged and indigent that was previously facilitated through filial support laws remained, but the
means to achieve this goal was transferred to the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
Two states, Idaho and Iowa, very recently repealed their filial
support statutes for these reasons. In repealing its filial support
law in 2011, the Idaho legislature believed the law no longer had
a valid purpose after the passage of Medicaid. 10 It aimed to repeal
the law to "remov[e] the possibility" it would be used by individual in Idaho "in ignorance by county indigency programs or Medicaid."21' Iowa also repealed its filial support statute in 2015 under
the premise that only the poor person himself is liable for any

205. See supra Part III.F.
206. National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 29 (Eng.).
207. Id.
208. Pearson, supra note 29, at 271.
209. State Welfare Comm'r v. Mintz, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)
(citing McKinney's 1966 Session Laws, vol. 2, pp. 2, 2989-90).
210. See S.B. 1043, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Id. 2011); see also S.B. 1043, Statement of
Purpose (Id. 2011).
211. S.B. 1043, Statement of Purpose (Id. 2011).
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debt he may have caused.212 Virginia should follow this trend and
either repeal or reform its filial support statute.
E. Potential Cures?
The most direct remedy to resolve the issues surrounding filial
support is to repeal Virginia Code section 20-88. Few, if any, Virginians would be affected,213 and it would likely save future citizens from liability for the actions of another. Where Medicaid
does not provide coverage and the parent cannot support herself
through no fault of her own, the General Assembly should, at a
minimum, better define the parameters of when the state requires adult children to contribute for the benefit of their parents.
"Necessitous circumstances" is ambiguous and could lend itself
to various interpretations. 21 4' The 1978 Virginia Circuit Court case
Peyton v. Peyton does not explicitly re-define "necessitous circumstances" but alludes that "some testimony with respect to certain
jewelry, oriental rugs and other property possibly titled in the
Mother's name ...[was in]sufficient to outweigh the evidence of
necessitous circumstances" because no evidence of legal title to
such property was given." 5 Overall, this could indicate that the
burden lies on the defendant to rebut the element of "necessitous
circumstances." These unclear elements are daunting for practitioners who aim to understand what standard they should
prove.2 1 Thus, the Virginia legislature should, at the very least,
better define this element. Additionally, taking into account the
212. H.F. 157, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015).
213. Idaho's repeal of its filial responsibility statute noted there would be zero negative
fiscal impact. S.B. 1043, Statement of Purpose (Id. 2011).
214. Jurisdictions have varied in their interpretations of when one is poor enough for
its filial support law to be applicable. See Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 597 (Pa. 1994)
(holding statute applicable whore parent'o reasonable care and maintenance expenses exceeded monthly social security income); Pavlick v. Teresinski, 149 A.2d 300, 302 (N.J. Juv.
& Dom. Rel. Ct. 1959) (holding parent sufficiently indigent despite owning a house and
furniture).
215. 8 Va. Cir. 531, 534 (1978) (Arlington County). It also held social security benefits
do not qualify as receiving "public assistance," which would disqualify a section 20-88 action. Id. at 532. Richmond attorney R. Shawn Majette disagreed with this finding, noting
that the purpose of providing Social Security benefits is to essentially provide enough asoistance so as one would not be in "necessitou ciroumstanee." Telephone Interview with
R. Shawn Majette, supranote 5.
216. Patrick Maurer noted the large amount of time spent on defending a suit pursuant
to section 20 88 because he was concerned the otatute's ambiguity could load to negative
results for his client. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3.
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way in which the parent got into such circumstances would help
to avoid cases where a person is liable due to an irresponsible
parent.
Furthermore, the defenses in the statute should be strengthened and better defined. In doing so, the General Assembly could
help adult children avoid liability for a parent who took little or
no part in his or her life.217
The statute could also provide more predictability on the
amount of the obligation one could be subjected to if held liable.
Virginia provides such predictability when it comes to child support by taking into account the parent's income and other specific
factors, producing an easy-to-follow guide to determine the child
support obligation.218 A similar type of chart that takes into account the adult child's income, size of family for which he or she
provides, and the parent's expenses would help practitioners
guide their clients' expectations.219 Such a guideline would help
lawyers navigate the ambiguous law and provide uniformity in
application.
Lastly, Virginia should eliminate the criminal liability imposed." The aim of the statute is to use a private source to fund
the elderly, not to punish a child. It makes little sense to impose a
penalty that is not tailored to the law's purpose.221 Richmond attorney R. Shawn Majette analogized imposing a criminal penalty
for such a financial obligation to the old-fashioned and unconstitutional debtors' prisons."'

217. See, e.g., Cannon v. Juras, 515 P.2d 428, 429-30 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (holding child
liable for mother who permitted her new husband to expol the child from the home at age
sixteen).,
218. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016) ("Guideline for determination of
child support").
219. Attorney R. Shawn Majette noted the difficulty in counseling clients on potential
liability under the statute and suggested a chart like this would ameliorate some issues.
See Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5.
220. Virginia currently imposes a midomoanor oharge on a peroon who violatec Vir
ginia Code section 20-88 to "be punished by a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in
jail for a period not exceeding twelve months or both." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol.
2016).
221. See Sisaket, supra note 53, at 98.
222. See Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5; see also Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) ("[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a
fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.").
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CONCLUSION

Virginia should repeal or amend Virginia Code section 20-88 as
its old-fashioned concepts, unequal coverage, ambiguous requirements, coupled with societal change, federal mandates, and
potential for abuse far outweigh any actual benefit that might be
derived by the Commonwealth and its citizens. Imposition of a
significant long-term financial liability on a person, solely because of a blood relation, is an antiquated concept that has long
since passed.
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